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In order to be practically useful, quantum cryptography must not only provide a guarantee of
secrecy, but it must provide this guarantee with a useful, sufficiently large throughput value.
The standard result of generalized privacy amplification yields an upper bound only on the
average value of the mutual information available to an eavesdropper. Unfortunately this result
by itself is inadequate for cryptographic applications. A naive application of the standard result
leads one to incorrectly conclude that an acceptable upper bound on the mutual information
has been achieved. It is the pointwise value of the bound on the mutual information, associated
with the use of some specific hash function, that corresponds to actual implementations. We
provide a fully rigorous mathematical derivation that shows how to obtain a cryptographically
acceptable upper bound on the actual, pointwise value of the mutual information. Unlike the
bound on the average mutual information, the value of the upper bound on the pointwise mutual
information and the number of bits by which the secret key is compressed are specified by two
different parameters, and the actual realization of the bound in the pointwise case is necessarily
associated with a specific failure probability. The constraints amongst these parameters, and
the effect of their values on the system throughput, have not been previously analyzed. We show
that the necessary shortening of the key dictated by the cryptographically correct, pointwise
bound, can still produce viable throughput rates that will be useful in practice.
I INTRODUCTION
Quantum cryptography has been heralded as providing
an important advance in secret communications because
it provides a guarantee that the amount of mutual in-
formation available to an eavesdropper can uncondition-
ally be made arbitrarily small. Any practical realization
of quantum key distribution that consists only of sifting,
error correction and authentication will allow some infor-
mation leakage, thus necessitating privacy amplification.
Of course, one might contemplate carrying out privacy
amplification after executing a classical key distribution
protocol. In the absence of any assumed conditions on
the capability of an eavesdropper, it is not possible to de-
duce a provable upper bound on the leaked information in
the classical case, so that the subsequent implementation
of privacy amplification would produce nothing, i.e., the
“input” to the privacy amplification algorithm cannot be
bounded, and as a result neither can the “output.” In the
case of quantum key distribution, however, the leaked in-
formation associated with that string which is the input
to the privacy amplification algorithm can be bounded,
and this can be done in the absence of any assumptions
about the capability of an eavesdropper. This bound is
not good enough for cryptography, however. Neverthe-
less, this bound on the input allows one to prove a bound
on the output of privacy amplification, so that one de-
duces a final, unconditional upper bound on the mutual
information available to an eavesdropper. Moreover this
bound can be made arbitrarily small, and hence good
enough for cryptography, at the cost of suitably shorten-
ing the final string.
Except that as usually presented this is not exactly true.
The above understanding is usually presented in connec-
tion with the standard result of generalized privacy am-
plification given in [1], which applies only to the average
value of the mutual information. The average is taken
with respect to a set of elements, namely, the universal2
class of hash functions introduced by Carter andWegman
[2]. The actual implementation of privacy amplification,
however, will be executed by software and hardware that
selects a particular hash function. The bound on the av-
erage value of the mutual information does not apply to
this situation: it does not directly measure the amount
of mutual information available to an eavesdropper in
practical quantum cryptography.
In this paper we calculate cryptographically accept-
able pointwise bounds on the mutual information which
can be achieved while still maintaining sufficiently high
throughput rates. In contrast to a direct application of
the privacy amplification result of [1], we must also con-
sider and bound a probability of choosing an unsuitable
hash function and relate this to cryptographic properties
of the protocol and the throughput rate. The relation
between average bounds and pointwise bounds of ran-
dom variables is not new and follows from elementary
probability theory, as was also noticed in [4].
II PRIVACY AMPLIFICATION
In ideal circumstances, the outcome of a k-bit key-
exchange protocol is a k-bit key shared between Alice and
Bob which is kept secret from Eve. Perfect secrecy means
that from Eve’s perspective the shared key is chosen uni-
formly from the space of k-bit keys. In practice, one can
only expect Eve’s probability distribution for the shared
key be close to uniform in the sense that its Shannon en-
tropy is close to its largest possible value k. Moreover,
because quantum key-exchange protocols implemented in
practice inevitably leak information to Eve, Eve’s distri-
bution of the key is too far from uniform to be usable
for cryptographic purposes. Privacy amplification is the
process of obtaining a nearly uniformly distributed key
in a keyspace of smaller bitsize.
We review the standard assumptions of the underly-
ing probability model of [1]: Ω is the underlying sam-
ple space with probability measure P. Expectation of
a real random variable X with respect to P is denoted
EX . W is a random variable with key material known
jointly to Alice and Bob and V is a random variable with
Eve’s information about W . W takes values in some fi-
nite keyspace W . The distribution of W is the function
PW(w) = P(W = w) for w ∈ W . Eve’s distribution hav-
ing observed a value v of V is the conditional probability
PW |V=v(w) = P(W = w|V = v) on W . In the the dis-
cussion that follows, v is fixed and accordingly we denote
Eve’s distribution of Alice and Bob’s shared key given v
by PEve. H and R denote Shannon and Renyi entropies
of random variables defined on W relative to PEve.
Definition II.1 Suppose Y is a keyspace. If α is a
positive real number, a mapping γ : W → Y is an
α strong uniformizer for Eve’s distribution iff H(γ) =∑
y∈Y PEve(γ
−1(y)) log2PEve(γ
−1(y)) ≥ log2 |Y| − α.
If γ is an α strong uniformizer, then we obtain a bound
on the mutual information between Eve’s data V and the
image of the hash transformation Y as follows:
I(Y, V ) = I(Y )−H(Y |V ) = log
2
|Y| −H(γ) ≤ α . (1)
Definition II.2 Let Γ be a random variable with values
in YW (space of functionsW → Y) which is conditionally
independent of W given V = v i.e. P(Γ = γ and W =
w|V = v) = P(Γ = γ|V = v)P(W = w|V = v). Γ is an
α > 0 average uniformizer for Eve’s distribution iff
E(HΓ) ≥ log2 |Y| − α (2)
where HΓ = HΓ(z) = H(Γ(z)).
If Γ is an α average uniformizer, the bound is on the
mutual information averaged over the set Γ:
I(Y,ΓV ) = I(Y )−H(Y |ΓV ) = log
2
|Y| −E(HΓ) ≤ α .
(3)
Uniformizers are produced stochastically. Notice that
by the conditional stochastic independence assumption,
z can be assumed to vary independently of w ∈ W with
the law PEve.
Proposition II.3 Suppose Γ is an α average uni-
formizer. Then for every β > 0, Γ(ω) is a β strong
uniformizer for ω outside a set of probability α
β
.
Proof. Note that for any γ : W → Y, H γ is at
most log2 |Y|. Thus log2 |Y| − HΓ is a nonnegative
random variable. Applying Chebychev’s inequality to
log
2
|Y| −HΓ, it follows that for every β > 0,
P
(
log2 |Y| − β ≥ HΓ
)
≤
1
β
E(log2 |Y| −HΓ)
=
1
β
(
log2 |Y| −E(HΓ)
)
≤
1
β
α.
The random variable Γ is strongly universal2 iff for all
x 6= x′ ∈ X ,
P{z : Γ(z)(x) = Γ(z)(x′)} ≤
1
|Y|
. (4)
The following is the main result of [1]:
Proposition II.4 (BBCM Privacy Amplification).
Suppose Γ is a universal2 family of mappings W → Y
conditionally independent of W . Then Γ is a 2
log2 |Y|−R(X)
ln 2
average uniformizer for X.
III PRACTICAL RESULTS
We will refer to the inequality that provides the upper
bound on the average value of the mutual information
as the average privacy amplification bound, or APA, and
we will refer to the inequality that provides the upper
bound on the actual, or pointwise mutual information as
the pointwise privacy amplifcation bound, or PPA.
In carrying out privacy amplification we must shorten
the key by the number of bits of information that have
potentially been leaked to the eavesdropper [3]. Having
taken that into account, we denote by g the additional
number of bits by which the key length will be further
shortened to assure sufficient secrecy, i.e., the additional
bit subtraction amount, and we refer to g as the privacy
amplification subtraction parameter. With this definition
of g, Bennett et al. [1] show as a corollary of II.4 that
the set of Carter-Wegman hash functions is an 2−g/ ln 2
average uniformizer. We thus have for the APA bound
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on 〈I〉, the average value of the mutual information, the
inequality
〈I〉 ≡ I(Y,ΓV ) ≤
2−g
ln 2
. (5)
In the case of APA the quantity g plays a dual role: in
addition to representing the number of additional sub-
traction bits, for the APA case g also directly determines
the upper bound on the average of the mutual informa-
tion.
In the case of PPA we again employ the symbol g to
denote the number of subtraction bits, as above for APA,
but the upper bound on the pointwise mutual informa-
tion is now given in terms of a different quantity g′, which
we refer to as the pointwise bound parameter. Also in the
case of PPA we need the parameter g′′, which we refer to
as the pointwise probability parameter, in terms of which
we may define the failure probability Pf . This definition
is motivated by II.3, from which we find that the Carter-
Wegman hash functions are 2−g
′
/ ln 2 strong uniformizers
except on a set of probability
Pf ≡
2−g
ln 2
/2−g′
ln 2
. (6)
We therefore define the pointwise probability parameter
as
g′′ ≡ g − g′ . (7)
Thus the quantities g, g′ and g′′ are not all independent,
and are constrained by equation 7. In terms of these pa-
rameters we have for the PPA bound on I, the actual
value of the mutual information, the inequality
I ≡ I(Y, V ) ≤
2−g
′
ln 2
=
2−(g−g
′′)
ln 2
(8)
where the associated failure probability Pf is given by
Pf = 2
−g′′ . (9)
The failure probability is not even a defined quantity in
the APA case, but it plays a crucial role in the PPA
case. Thus, the bound on the pointwise mutual informa-
tion is directly determined by the value of the parameter
g′, with respect to which one finds a tradeoff between g,
the number of additional compression bits by which the
key is shortened, and g′′, the negative logarithm of the
corresponding failure probability.
IV APPLICATION OF POINTWISE BOUND
Operationally, it will usually be the case in practice
that end-users of quantum key distribution systems will
be first and foremost constrained to ensure that a given
upper bound on the pointwise mutual information avail-
able to the enemy is realized.
To appreciate the significance of the distinction be-
tween the PPA and APA results, we will consider an
illustrative example that shows how reliance on the APA
bound can lead to complete compromise of cryptographic
security. We begin with the APA case. As noted above,
in the case of APA the privacy amplification subtraction
parameter, which we will now denote by gAPA to empha-
size the nature of he bound, directly specifies both the
upper bound on 〈I〉 and also the number of bits by which
the key needs to be shortened to achieve this bound.
Without loss of generality we take the value of the pri-
vacy amplification subtraction parameter to be given by
gAPA = 30, which means that, in addition to the com-
pression by the number of bits of information that were
estimated to have been leaked, the final length of the key
will be further shortened by an additional 30 bits. This
results in an upper bound on the average mutual infor-
mation given by 〈I〉 ≤ 2−30/ ln 2 ≃ 1.34 × 10−9, which
we take as the performance requirement for this exam-
ple. While this might appear to be an acceptable bound,
the fact that it applies only to the average of the mutual
information of course means that it is not the quantity
we require.
We turn to the PPA case, with respect to which we
will now refer to the privacy amplification subtraction
parameter as gPPA. In order to discuss the PPA bound
we must select appropriate values amongst gPPA, g
′ and
g′′. In the APA case discussed above, the bound on the
(average) mutual information and the number of sub-
traction bits are both specified by the same parameter
gAPA. In the PPA case, the number of subtraction bits
and the parameter that specifies the bound on the (point-
wise) mutual information are not the same. To achieve
the same value for the upper bound on I as we dis-
cussed for the upper bound on 〈I〉 above, we must se-
lect g′ = 30 as the value of the pointwise bound parame-
ter. From eq.(8) this indeed yields the required inequality
I ≤ 2−30/ ln 2 ≃ 1.34 × 10−9. However, with respect to
this requirement on the value on the mutual information,
i.e., the required final amount of cryptographic secrecy,
there are a denumerable set (since bits are discrete) of dif-
ferent amounts of compression of the key that are possi-
ble to select, each associated with a corresponding failure
probability, Pf , in the form of ordered pairs (gPPA, g
′′)
that satisfy the constraint given by gPPA = g
′ + g′′ (cf
eq.(7)).
Our starting point was the secrecy performance re-
quirement that must be satisfied. On the basis of the
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APA analysis above, one might conclude that in order
to achieve the required secrecy performance constraint it
is sufficient to shorten the key by 30 bits. However in
the PPA case, satisfying the same performance require-
ment and shortening the key by 30 bits means choosing
identical values for the privacy amplification subtraction
parameter (gPPA = 30) and the pointwise bound param-
eter (g′ = 30). However, we note from eq.(7) that in the
case of the PPA bound, gPPA and g
′ become the same
only when g′′ = 0, which corresponds to 100% failure
probability on the upper bound. This is clearly crypto-
graphically useless!
This example emphasizes the importance of assuring a
sufficiently small failure probability in addition to a suffi-
ciently small upper bound on the mutual information. As
we see from the above example, the APA result provides
no information about the correct number of subtraction
bits that are required in order to achieve a specified up-
per bound on the pointwise mutual information with a
suitable failure probability, for which it is essential to use
the PPA result instead. In Figure 1 we have plotted the
failure probability as a function of the upper bound on
the mutual information, for a family of choices of gPPA
values. Returning to the example discussed above for the
APA bound, we see that if we need to achieve an upper
bound on I of about 10−9, we may do so with a failure
probability of about (coincidentally) 10−9, at the cost
of shortening the final key by 60 bits: the secrecy is dic-
tated by the pointwise bound parameter value of g′ = 30,
which is effected by choosing gPPA = 60, corresponding
to Pf ≃ 10
−9. Smaller upper bounds can obviously be
obtained, with suitable values of the failure probability,
at the cost of further shortening of the key.
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In Figure 2 we plot the throughput of secret Vernam
cipher material in bits per second, as a function of bit cell
period, for the two bit subtraction amounts gPPA = 30
and gPPA = 60. The example chosen is a representative
scenario for applied quantum cryptography. In calculat-
ing the rate we follow the method described in reference
[3]. We assume the use of an attenuated, pulsed laser,
with Alice located on a low earth orbit satellite at an
altitude of 300 kilometers and Bob located at mean sea
level, with the various system parameters corresponding
to those for Scenario (i) in Section 5.3.2 in [3], except that
here the source of the quantum bits operates at a pulse
repetition frequency (PRF) of 1 MHz, and we specifi-
cally assume that the enemy does not have the capability
to make use of prior shared entanglement in conducting
eavesdropping attacks. We see that the additional cost
incurred in subtracting the amount required to achieve
the required mutual information bound and failure prob-
ability reduces the throughput rate by an amount that is
likely to be acceptable for most purposes. For instance,
for a source PRF of 1 MHz we find that the throughput
rate with a value of gPPA = 30 is 5614 bits per second.
With a subtraction amount of gPPA = 60 the throughput
rate drops to 5563 bits per second [5].
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V CONCLUSIONS
The significance and proper implementation of privacy
amplification in quantum cryptography are clarified by
our analysis. By itself the bound on the average value
of the mutual information presented in [1] does not al-
low one to determine the values of parameters required
to bound the actual, pointwise value of the mutual in-
formation. Those parameters must satisfy a constraint,
which in turn implies a constraint on the final through-
put of secret key material. We have rigorously derived the
cryptographically meaningful upper bound on the point-
wise mutual information associated with the use of some
specific privacy amplification hash function, and shown
that the corresponding requirements on the shortening of
the key still allow viable throughput values.
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